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This paper stems from the debate on food security that has been
under way since the World Food Summit of 1996. It discusses the
viability of a type of programmatic proposal deriving from the Rome
Declaration and Plan of Action signed by the Governments of 148
countries, and it suggests that the implementation of the Plan of Action
requires the establishment of a structural link between the population
affected by food insecurity –usually unable to make its views known or
exert pressure– and the various authorities responsible for initiating
public action. The central hypothesis of this paper is that this structural
link can be centred upon family farmers. It argues that food security,
underpinned by the right to food, is a territorial expression of civic rights.
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I
Food security: new ideas and
new practices
Although we now know that the world produces far
more food than is required to meet the needs of its
inhabitants, almost 800 million human beings, or one
in seven, suffer from hunger (FAO, 2002a). The answer
to overcoming this scourge lies not so much in
increasing farm output in developing countries, as was
formerly believed, as in generating work and income
opportunities and in increasing the scope for marketing
the agricultural products produced by the population
of these countries.
The last 50 years in family farming have been
marked by a combination of: rising prices for farm
inputs and equipment, cutbacks in State subsidies and
protection systems, and a dramatic decline in market
prices for agricultural products.
This decline has been due to transformations in
telecommunications and information technologies, the
green revolution, and changes in biotechnology. At
present, however, the main cause seems to lie in the
production and export subsidy policies applied by
developed countries, particularly those of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). A study by the United States
Department of Agriculture (Burfisher, 2001) found that
the tariffs and subsidies of developed countries
depressed agricultural prices by up to 12% and were
the cause of almost 80% of distortions in world trade.
Taken together, the distortion of the export
capacity of developing countries and the fall in
international farm prices seem to be holding back the
development of agriculture in these countries to a very
marked degree (Rello and Trápaga, 2001).
Nonetheless, Burfisher (2001) argues that
abolition of tariffs and production and export subsidies
in developed countries would not in itself be enough
to remove the distortions that affect the exporting
capacity of developing countries. This measure would
need to be combined with others: improvements in the
competitiveness of the agricultural economy in
developing countries (particularly where small farmers
are concerned), chiefly through investment in
infrastructure and human capital formation, together
with institution-building and, no less importantly, steps
to reduce the high levels of social inequality, poverty
and malnutrition that afflict them.
1. The situation in Latin America and the
Caribbean
As noted above, in the short term the issue of world
food security is, strictly speaking, not a technical one.
The problem is that the means of production required
to meet food demand are lacking, and that the neediest
groups in rural and urban areas have insufficient
purchasing power (FAO, 2000). In Latin America and
the Caribbean, almost 54 million people are suffering
from hunger and malnutrition. Instead of falling, this
number has risen in some subregions, the situation in
Central America and the Caribbean being of particular
concern. Furthermore, some 211 million people in the
region are poor, a rise of 11 million since 1990, and 89
million of these live in extreme poverty. The highest
incidence of poverty (ECLAC, 2002) is in the countryside,
where almost 54% of the population are below the
poverty line and 31% are below the indigence line, i.e.,
their income is too low to meet their basic food
requirements.
The problems of food insecurity and poverty are
aggravated by the inequality of income distribution.
In most of the region’s countries the richest 10% of
households receive more than 30% of all income and,
in almost all of them, the percentage of total income
received by the poorest 40% of households ranges
from 9% to 15% (ECLAC, 2002). Because local wages
are low, some countries have achieved sufficient
levels of production and productivity to become
exporters of certain agricultural products and increase
their incomes. Nonetheless, the fact is that extreme
poverty and chronic undernutrition have not
  The information and views in this article are the author’s alone
and do not necessarily coincide with those of FAO. The author is
grateful to Hernán Gómez, Carlos Icaza, Paul Lewin and Rodrigo
Paillacar for their comments and assistance with the preliminary
editing of this article.
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disappeared and have even increased in many countries
(FAO, 2002a).
To sum up, the agricultural transformations of the
last half-century have taken the region’s agriculture
towards two extremes: at one extreme there is a
modern, profitable and mechanized agriculture that
uses agrochemicals and high-yield varieties, while at
the other, there is a subsistence agriculture with all its
poverty, exclusion and hunger (FAO, 2000).
2. FAO and the Special Programme for Food
Security
With the goals of the World Food Summit in mind, the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) has launched the Special Programme for
Food Security (SPFS). The Programme consists of
measures to improve a country’s food security and
aims to be something more than a pilot project, as the
idea is to propose and develop national food security
policies in countries requesting this. As originally
conceived, it set out from the premise that viable
technologies were available which, if applied properly
in the countries worst affected by problems of food
security, could increase agricultural productivity and
food output. The original approach was too heavily
oriented towards food supply and did not consider the
role of institutions and actors in the results that would
ensue.
Current trends in the economic, political and
social dimensions of this issue1 have led to a new
conception of food security, and hence to the need for
FAO to refocus its programmes in this area.
Evaluations of the SPFS have highlighted the following
(FAO, 2002c):
i) “When the SPFS started it had what the Evaluation
Team regards as a rigid and inflexible design. It
also required that it initially be implemented in
those areas where there was the potential for
rapidly increasing production. These areas were
characterised as being where there were irrigation
possibilities. It was envisioned that the production
focus would help solve food security problems
both at the household and national levels. It soon
became apparent that the early ‘micro’ oriented
production focus was insufficient to ensure
progress in solving the food security problem and
that ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ type issues were important
in enabling production increases to occur, and in
ensuring benefits accrue to the producers.”
ii) As a result, “the sites selected for SPFS activities
in the case study countries, have in general been
of relatively high productivity, compared with the
more marginal areas where the degree of
malnourishment in rural areas is higher but the
potential for increases in agricultural productivity
are lower. Thus, although in the opinion of the
Evaluation Team the areas selected for SPFS
activities are likely to be the best as far as
potentially improving national food security is
concerned, in terms of improving individual
household food security the impact of SPFS type
activities was likely to have been higher in the
marginal areas.”
iii) “Success of the SPFS type of approach is very
dependent on the strength of the institutional
structures, including extension, credit, input
distribution and product marketing systems.
Where there are deficiencies in this, it is very
unlikely that a two to three year period will be
sufficient to demonstrate impact.”
iv) “Systematic evidence of the degree of adoption/
uptake of the technologies demonstrated by the
SPFS was not available, partly because the SPFS has
not generally collected such information and
partly because many of the projects are ongoing,
or have only recently ended. […] there was
relatively little evidence of continued use of
technologies after project demonstrations, or of
adoption by farmers who had had no association
with SPFS.”
v) “The SPFS has made extensive use of subsidies to
encourage technology adoption. This has taken
two forms: providing inputs free to farmers and/
or giving inputs at subsidised rates. This needs to
be re-examined particularly since it does not bode
well for the sustainability of the technologies after
direct SPFS support to initiatives ceases.”
vi) “In general, to date, the impact of SPFS on national
policies relating to food security, and on the donor
community in terms of strategies for enhancing
food security in Low Income Food Deficit
1 Including lower international prices; high levels of poverty, hunger,
undernutrition and inequity; heterogeneity in the asset endowment
of family farmers; segmentation of labour markets; low investment
by rural families; information asymmetry in markets; inadequacy
and misallocation of public goods in the rural sector; duality of the
rural sector, with the coexistence of competitive and subsistence
farming; lack of rural infrastructure; lack of institutional capabilities;
limited response capabilities of research and development systems,
and the existence of a digital divide between town and countryside.
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Countries (LIFDCs) and resource mobilization for
SPFS follow-up, has been limited.”2
The SPFS has also undergone adaptations to suit it
to the specific conditions prevailing in Latin America
and the Caribbean: i) it is financed out of the public-
sector resources of the countries themselves; ii) it
operates in countries at an intermediate level of
development3 and not only in those with low incomes
and a food deficit; iii) it is multisectoral; iv) coverage
is national from the outset, and v) it is of long duration.
Again, some phenomena specific to the region, or to
certain areas within it, affect food security. These include
institutional weakness; problems with consolidating
decentralization; high vulnerability to natural disasters
and an urgent need to improve risk management (by
means of early warning systems, for instance), the high
social and economic risk entailed by overdependence
on some commodity whose price can suddenly fall
sharply, such as coffee; and the various tensions caused
by trade integration processes (such as the process whose
objective is the Free Trade Area of the Americas) and
treaties.
With this revised approach to food security,
conceived as a right and having the central objective
of improving family access to food, the unit of
reference ceases to be the farm and becomes the rural
family instead. The result is a comprehensive approach
that focuses more on people’s welfare than on raising
agricultural output or productivity.
Thus, food security is no longer treated merely as
an exercise in technology transfer, but has been
established as a civic right. This raises a crucial question:
what segment of the population are these food security
programmes aimed at?
Any food security policy whose central thrust is
the right to food obviously needs a clear definition of
the population at risk, such as landless peasants, small
farmers, rural families, indigenous populations,
women, children and settlers in peri-urban areas.
Nonetheless, targeting the population at risk does not
in itself guarantee that this population will be
incorporated into food security programmes and
projects. There needs to be a structural link between
this population, which generally has no way of making
its views heard or exerting pressure, and the various
authorities responsible for initiating public action.
Without such a structural link, the gap tends to be filled
by political patronage, or the measures taken do not
reach the population at risk but are captured by other
sectors with greater bargaining power. The present
article suggests that this structural link can be made
with family farmers, both because of their dynamism
and because of the enormous presence that ensues from
the multifunctional character of their production
activities.
The key question, after presenting the type of
programmatic proposal stemming from this expanded
version of food security programmes, is how politically
and economically viable this type of proposal can be
in Latin America. A basic strategy to pursue new forms
of public intervention in the countryside clearly requires
building a consensus in relation to the objectives, terms
and costs of the main rural advancement policies.
These agreements then need to be converted into legal
reforms to ensure that commitments will be honoured
and to guarantee policy continuity. To be able to gauge
the viability of this proposal, it is now necessary to
examine the conditions under which consensus could
be arrived at. I shall begin with some reflections on
recent social movements in the countryside and on the
nature of the structural reforms of the 1990s, which
have been one of the main causes of these movements,
before laying out a set of specific proposals based on
the concept of the right to food.
2 The evaluation was conducted by a representative team of nine
senior external consultants with the operational support of the FAO
Evaluation Service. The Evaluation Team visited the regional offices
of FAO  and 12 countries in the developing regions where the SPFS
has been applied (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Ecuador,
Eritrea, Haiti, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia).
The Team selected the countries to be visited from a list of 18
countries representing all the developing regions drawn up by FAO.
These were countries where fieldwork had begun at least three years
before and had covered at least three of the four components of the
SPFS. The selection criteria made it certain that the evaluation work
of the Team would be based on considerable experience with SPFS
implementation.
3 Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Venezuela.
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II
Social mobilization as a means
of generating institutions
1. Some thoughts about the meaning of rural
movements
The profound changes that Latin America is
undergoing make social protests and unrest inevitable.
From the standpoint adopted in this paper, social
protests can be seen not just as a means of changing
the correlation of forces and increasing the bargaining
power of certain social actors, but also as a force for
productive restructuring and institutional innovation in
societies that are quite unequal, fragmented and fragile
from an institutional point of view. This approach
yields a specific dilemma: how can social conflicts be
solved in this sphere without irreversible confrontation
between social actors? And how can conflict resolution
processes and efforts be guided so that institutional
agreements are strengthened, or new ones generated?
Social movements arise as a form of positioning
in response to change, when social actors and
organizations feel affected, or potentially affected, by
the appearance of new institutional arrangements or the
abandonment of old ones. It must be stressed here that
any attempt to classify rural movements into exclusive
categories comes up against the frequent overlaps
between different demands and types of struggle,
owing to the ambivalent and changing nature of rural
actors in their relationship with society at large and
with the State and market in particular.
Social mobilization can be channelled through
agreements based on an ethics of responsibility that
makes it possible to experiment with innovative
institutional arrangements. Obviously, not all social
movements result in institutional innovation, since they
entail a high risk of disruption, spurred in Latin
America by two factors whose conjunction has helped
shape the current situation in the region: structural
social inequality, which is of very long standing and
does not date only from the current period of reforms,
and extremely rapid change, carried through hastily and
clumsily, which is undermining social cohesion and
cultural certainties.
After almost two decades of structural reform, it
should be clear that any society is a highly dynamic
human construction where conflicts and tensions are
not the exception, but the rule. It is even more obvious
that these conflicts come to the surface at times like
the present, when societies are in the grip of profound
changes of both global and local origin. It is precisely
at such times that it is essential to establish a strong
link between a sound legal framework and social
movements, to assist in the transition from social
protest –which is spontaneous and disruptive by its
very nature– to collective civic action. This transition
from spontaneity to rationality in collective action is
not just a change from the short term to the long in the
outlook of social actors. It is also the basis for mutual
agreements between State organs and social actors.
More importantly still, this bridge between legality and
spontaneous mobilization can ensure that social
protests and conflicts are transformed into innovations,
experiments and solutions, both in the sphere of the
actual rules used to channel conflicts and in the spheres
that gave rise to mobilization. This bridge-building
process is what I call social mobilization as a means
of generating institutions.
What has happened recently in many of the social
movements that have arisen in the region has been a
spontaneous, violent upheaval in certain sectors of
society, followed by direct repression and short-termist,
ad hoc solutions to contain them. In many cases,
protests have led to the resignation of democratically
elected Presidents: De la Rúa in Argentina, Fujimori
in Peru and, recently, Sánchez de Losada in Bolivia.4
The message of recent rural movements seems
fairly clear, even though these have differed from one
another and varied in intensity. They have not only
been insisting on more equal opportunities, but rejecting
a view of redistributive justice centred exclusively on
corporate agreements. Involvement in making and
implementing decisions is another demand. The
unifying principle is an expanded vision of popular
sovereignty, in which the principle of justice is
associated with the principle of democracy. The freedom
4 What Luis Maira has called “the revocation by society of
presidential mandates”.
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being fought for involves equal participation at the
various levels of society and the State.
Faced with these demands, the promise held out
by reforms aiming at economic and political
liberalization in Latin America was the formal abolition
of policies with an anti-agricultural bias; however,
appreciating exchange rates, the systematic decline of
international agricultural prices and tight credit have
cancelled out many of the advantages that this model
offered to the farm sector. Consequently, public
policies for the countryside have been exploited by a
small oligarchy that has skewed their content and
implementation in their own favour, or subordinated
them to the interests of the most powerful urban actors,
so that they have tended to become appendages of a
development strategy.
2. The rage to conclude:5 the pace of reform
Developments in the rural sector of Latin America in
recent years can be described as a long transition towards
institutionalized forms of democratic governance.
The structural reforms of recent decades sought
economic stabilization as a means towards
competitiveness. The main changes implemented were:
deregulation, the modernization of bureaucracies and
the privatization of the main State-owned firms.6
These reforms gave way to a period of institutional
crisis in the rural sector, marked by four factors: i) an
institutional vacuum, as economic liberalization was
affected by the unsuccessful or incomplete transfer of
operating functions from the State to the private sector
in particular areas, such as agricultural extension, the
marketing of agricultural products and formal credit;7
ii) a mismatch between the desire and ability of rural
institutions to renew themselves; iii) resistance to
change and reforms, manifested in the absence of
mechanisms for dialogue and coordination, and iv) a
lack of coordination between institutional development
in the countryside and changes in the rest of the
economy and society.
The combination of these factors has often
resulted in selective modernization in particular sectors
or regions, based on simplistic economic criteria
classifying regions, and even individuals, as “viable”
and “unviable”. In fact, this has been the surest way
of intensifying productive and social imbalances in the
countryside.
Meanwhile, the efficiency factor in institutional
change cannot be separated from the distributive
factors involved in institutional reforms of all kinds,
which involve changes in power and political processes.
Under present circumstances, the macroeconomic
environment of the region’s countries cannot by itself
offer any real, lasting alternative to displaced rural actors
or areas. Thus, the absence of active development
policies inevitably results in an institutional vacuum
and social exclusion.
It makes no sense, therefore, to promote flexibility,
transparency and participation without recognizing the
crucial importance of public-sector intervention. At the
same time, it is surely vital to bring all the many
differentiated strategies and the social actors embodying
them into a broad dialogue whose outcome is
inclusiveness: the cornerstone of any effective rural
reform strategy is the inclusion of all social actors in
whatever institutional agreements are being worked
towards, i.e., the incorporation of rural workers, family
farming, indigenous populations, women, commercial
farmers, agro-industrialists, investors, and other
increasingly important actors such as supermarket
chains.8
But this dialogue needs precise rules and a
structure of incentives to ensure the inclusion of all
within the framework of an ethics of responsibility.
In this context, what I understand by institutional
reconstruction is a deliberate process undertaken by
sectors representing majority opinion in the State and
society in response to an extreme situation caused by
5 This is an allusion to Flaubert’s well-known phrase, quoted by
Albert Hirschman in his pivotal work on the unfinished drive for
reform in Latin America in the second half of the last century,
entitled Journeys towards Progress (Hirschman, 1963).
6 An initial phase sought to achieve economic stabilization by adjusting
macroeconomic prices (exchange rate, interest rate and inflation
control) to correct biases against certain sectors and encourage non-
inflationary economic growth. A second phase addressed market
failures through “structural change”; the main measures taken (trade
liberalization, privatization and deregulation) sought to make market
financing better and more transparent in order to solve the problems
of asymmetrical information. A third phase, which is barely
beginning in many of the region’s countries, seeks to address failures
of cooperation between social actors (see Gordillo, 1999).
7 The institutional vacuums left by the withdrawal of State action in
certain areas (in the absence of any deliberate policy to create new
institutional arrangements) have been filled haphazardly by parallel
markets and informal arrangements. The economic and social cost
has been high, especially when these processes are analysed over
the longer term.
8 Sectoral policies are no longer enough to safeguard the interests
of most families working in agriculture alone. What is needed now
is convergence with territorial policies that look beyond agriculture
to reduce inequalities and exploit natural resources rationally.
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a combination of social fragmentation and institutional
weakness and requiring a mutual pledging of rights and
obligations. These pledges are what I call pactos de
garantías, institutional constructs specific to these
situations that cover all three institutional spheres:
operational, governmental and constitutional. Because
the pledge cannot exist in a vacuum, the role of social
actors and movements has to be built into this
institutional scaffolding. A pacto de garantías has a
single purpose: to create a basis upon which the
differences that are inevitable in pluralist societies can
be resolved. The idea is not to attribute a mythical
value to consensus-building, but to appreciate that there
is no substitute for it when it comes to modulating the
pace of change. This process of institutional
reconstruction, of which the pacto de garantías is the
expression, can be driven by social movements, by
particular policies, and by a good structure of
enforcement institutions.
Institutional reconstruction seeks to address
problems of social cohesion. This has to be the central
objective of public policies in the rural sector, and it
needs to have the unquestionable social legitimacy that
can only be conferred by the participation of rural
actors in the design and implementation of such
policies.
Rural actors are interrelated with institutional
change: they are active agents9 and at the same time
they may be among those affected by change. Not all
actors participate in institutional change in the same way
or at the same time, but they all feel its repercussions,
albeit to differing degrees. Institutional reconstruction
in the countryside may mean, of course, that particular
agents find that their existence is imperilled,10 or that
they have to adopt a different collective identity. The
vital thing, though, is the pace at which these changes
are to be implemented.
As regards the political economy of reforms, of
their adoption and implementation,11 an important
consequence of the approach I suggest here is that
consensus-building is the only way of setting a “pace
of change” that allows the inevitable instability to be
managed. The idea is to map out a route towards
change that reflects consensus, directionality and
certainty in agricultural and rural policies, with a view
to creating security and avoiding the risks of
discretionary actions and authoritarian agricultural and
rural policies. These elements establish a vital basis that
enables future institutional development to acquire the
desired characteristics of autonomy, inclusiveness and
effective subsidiary action by the State.
It is necessary, then, to visualize an institutional
framework that takes in not only the different forms
of State intervention or the organization of State
agencies, but also the whole range of informal rules
and conventions, and indeed the ethical and moral
norms of conduct that are part of social interaction. In
this broader view, the main role of institutional
development is to increase efficiency and reduce
uncertainty by designing a stable (although not
immutable) structure conducive to economic and social
interaction. This structure of opportunities and
incentives is the determining factor in economic
performance.
This overarching institutional framework,
emerging from these bottom-up and top-down changes,
calls for a series of reflections about the right to food
as a territorial expression of civic rights, and about
decentralization in the framework of a regional
development policy.
9 They participate in or promote institutional change, for example,
by mobilizing; or, where local forums or councils exist (i.e., where
social interaction is institutionalized), by participating in discussions
or decision-making.
10 A local party chief, or an inefficient or incompetent public-sector
actor, may be deposed or taken to task as a result of institutional
change.
11 Probably one of the most important works dealing with the pace
of change is Karl Polanyi’s book The Great Transformation: The
Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Polanyi, 1957).
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III
Decentralization and the right to food
authorities to investigate and provide effective
recourse if this right is violated.
iii) Obligation to facilitate and if necessary to
provide. This means that the government has to
take pro-active measures to identify vulnerable
groups and apply policies so that they have access
to adequate food, facilitating their ability to feed
themselves. The obligation to provide goes further
than the obligation to facilitate, but only arises
when people’s food security is imperilled for
reasons beyond their control. As a last recourse,
it is considered that the need may arise to provide
direct assistance through protection networks.
These three levels give a better idea of the scope
of State obligations when it comes to guaranteeing the
right to food, and provide an ethical, political and legal
frame of reference. Basing public-sector rural
development policies on the exercise of human rights,
particularly the right to food, removes these policies
from the realm of charity or welfare and makes them
less vulnerable to the vagaries of politics. They become
legally enforceable, subject to scrutiny and, where
appropriate, arbitration.
Although the right to food has been recognized
in different international instruments, the concern to
have it treated as such in rural development and anti-
hunger policies only began to gain strength in the
1990s, as part of the debate about third-generation
rights. The 1996 World Food Summit took up this
debate and included among its commitments an
undertaking to clarify the substance of the right to
adequate food and freedom from hunger, and to pay
particular attention to its application.
Establishing a better definition of the right to food,
with a view to creating concrete instruments so that it
can be better applied, has begun to be a major concern
of civil society and some of the world’s governments.
It is worth giving a mention here to the proposal to
create an international code of conduct for the right to
food. Although this code would essentially be a
political document rather than a legal one, its approval
would establish a series of national and international
obligations and responsibilities, so that it would make
a valuable contribution to the construction of a new
system of world institutions based on the right to food,
12 See United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultu-
ral Rights (1999).
1. Progress with the human rights-based
approach to development
In seeking to design public policies that enhance the
competitiveness of family farmers and to establish fair
rules that give their products access to international
markets, it is necessary to get past the idea that the
development of peoples or individuals and the
struggle against hunger are acts of kindness on the
part of authority, and to recognize once and for all
that they are in fact part of any State’s obligation to
guarantee the exercise of universal human rights by
its citizens.
Although human rights have traditionally been
associated in the main with the civil and political
sphere, it is worth emphasizing that equal status was
accorded by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to various economic, social and cultural rights
that became the basis for the 1976 International Pact
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This Pact laid
down the obligation for States to guarantee the right
to food, which is deemed to have been fulfilled when
people have physical and financial access at all times
to adequate food and to the means of obtaining it.
This is often wrongly interpreted as meaning that
the State is obliged to feed its population, when what
the right to food actually means is that the State, and
particularly the government, has to respect and protect
people’s right to feed themselves. To clear up any
doubts, in 1999 the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights laid down the scope of State obligations
in this area in its General Comment No. 12.12 These
can be classified into three levels:
i) The obligation to respect. This lays down the limits
on the exercise of State power. It means that the
government must not interfere with people’s means
of subsistence, or obstruct their access to food, or
deprive them arbitrarily of their right to this.
ii) The obligation to protect. This means that the
government has to pass laws to prevent powerful
individuals or organizations from infringing
people’s right to food, and must appoint
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which would strongly influence the design of
development policies.
2. Decentralization and regional disparities
Despite almost universal acceptance of the merits
claimed for decentralizing reforms, and although these
have spread very widely in the region, there is still only
a fairly limited scientific understanding of the institutional
arrangements needed to underpin effective decentralized
administration. Furthermore, a growing body of empirical
evidence suggests that decentralization, be it
administrative, fiscal or political, or a combination of
these, can facilitate the emergence of collective action
institutions but does not automatically yield the
advantages envisioned by its supporters. It is necessary
to be wary, therefore, of the simplistic notion that
decentralization alone resolves some of the most
pressing problems in the countryside. As in any
institution-building process, what is needed is the right
mixture of national and local action. While
decentralization has generally been regarded as a
mechanism that strengthens social participation in the
design and implementation of public policies, to avoid
isolated measures that are likely to dislocate
government action it may be essential to place
decentralization within the framework of a regional
development policy.
More recently, as a result of globalization itself,
there has been a growing need for different measures
designed specifically to reduce socio-economic
disparities between territories and cities and to optimize
their development opportunities. These measures are
now known as territorial development policies (or more
simply, territorial policy). These policies are not aimed
just at the most disadvantaged territories, but at all of
them, from the richest to the poorest. Their objective
is not to attract investments to marginalized territories
by offering subsidies and other benefits to investors,
but to ensure that they are all in a position to maximize
their endogenous development opportunities. To
achieve this goal, it is essential to capitalize on the
advantages of each, the pull effect of their towns and
cities and the creation of assets. Of course, this does
not mean discontinuing assistance and compensation
for poorer territories, which need to benefit from
“financial equalization”, but generating the right kinds
of bonds and ties between those that progress more
rapidly and those that do not. Furthermore,
infrastructure needs to be provided for all to ensure a
minimum level of accessibility. Since this depends on
the individual characteristics of each, infrastructure
policies need to be based on a typology of territories
(Schejtman and Berdegué, 2003).
Territorial approaches are by definition
multisectoral and certainly need to help build bridges
among different development objectives and reconcile
them. Furthermore, these approaches offer two
additional benefits: they trigger a greater awareness of
the nature and urgency of problems, and they offer
solutions that are more compatible with local
constraints, be these institutional, financial or
environmental. Thus, when the heterogeneity of the rural
sector is overlooked and the countryside is identified with
agriculture,13 the scope for improving competitiveness
and mitigating rural poverty is reduced because factors
which dynamize agriculture itself and which may derive
from stronger links with nearby urban centres are not
considered. The bulk of activities are thus targeted on
farming, whereas the diagnosis ought to include in its
understanding of the countryside those urban centres
with which small producers are directly linked.
Examining demand in these urban centres and the
territorial sphere of small farmers can provide clues as
to needs that are going unmet, or that are being met
but with high transaction costs. Simple measures can
be taken to remedy this and thereby help to raise the
competitiveness of some of these producers or, in the
case of families with little or no land, to improve their
living and working conditions by lowering their
transaction costs across a range of activities. If projects
are to be key components in rural development
strategies, then, their design needs to take account of
the territory involved, the economic sectors acted upon,
the social structure of the territory and the duration of
processes, and to provide for an institutional structure
that ensures their sustainability over time.
Territorial development policies seek to raise a
territory’s value-added, achieve significant growth in
the rural economy and, in particular, enhance the social
capital of the territory rather than promoting the
development of any one economic activity in particular
(Abramovay, 1999). To this end, territorial
development takes a view of production chains that
goes beyond broader agriculture14 to the linkages
between the various sectors and actors in a given chain.
13 Thus it fails to take account of the links between the countryside
and urban centres, or the importance of rural non-farm employment,
which is expanding and influencing rural performance to an ever
greater degree.
14 Broader agriculture means the different linkages that agriculture
has with activities of other types generated around it. These activities
include, among others, demand for inputs, instruments and machinery,
post-harvest or processing activities applied to agricultural products,
and marketing.
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1. A mobilizing factor: family farmers
The experience of the last decade, whether in relation
to social mobilization or productive effort and
institutional innovations, tells us that the most dynamic
segment in the countryside are family farmers,
characterized in the region by the heterogeneity of their
resource endowment and assets, i.e., their natural,
physical, financial, human and social capital (de Janvry
and Sadoulet, 2001a). This inequality of conditions,
along with market failures, is one of the causes of rural
poverty.
In a simplification that does, however, reflect the
main characteristics of the Latin American and
Caribbean countryside, family farmers can be classified
into two major groups by asset level. The first group
comprises peasants whose territorial resources are so
small that they live essentially from wage labour, in
agriculture or elsewhere, supplementing their income
by farming. The second comprises family farmers who
own varying quantities of land and obtain much of their
income from crop growing, supplementing this by
selling their labour (ECLAC, 1999).
Workers in both groups are compelled to have
recourse to non-agricultural forms of rural employment
that supply a large part of rural households’ income and
act as a substitute for land as a source of earnings. In
a compilation study15 put together by de Janvry and
Sadoulet (2001a) it was found that in the Mexican ejido
(common land), for example, rural non-farm
employment accounted for 55% of total income (de
Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001b), while the figure was 61%
in Nicaragua and Panama (Davis, Carletto and Sil,
1997; World Bank, 1998), 67% and 60% in Chile and
El Salvador, respectively (López and Valdés, 1997),
and 86% in Ecuador (Lanjouw, 1996). It should be
pointed out, however, that these methods of
supplementing income are not enough to rescue family
farmers from the poverty in which they live. Owing
to institutional and market failures, moreover, families
have recently come to depend more and more on rural
non-farm income (especially remittances) and on
investment in animals and grains as a source of savings
and liquidity for emergencies.
The transition from protected agriculture to
agriculture with a broad basis of growth and
competitiveness will require the currently low levels
of investment prevailing among family farmers to
increase, and this will take a great deal of time. The
goal of improving access to food is closely linked to
the need to improve the competitiveness of family
farmers, on a territorial basis and with a focus on
families and family incomes.
But if we follow Easterly (2002), we can say that
the competitiveness of small farmers is also related to
the degree of inequity in a country, since inequality
hinders development. Sokoloff and Engerman (2002)16
suggest that asset endowment determines inequity,
which in turn is the root cause of poor institutions
(undemocratic and unstable), poor redistribution
policies, low investment in human capital, and
underdevelopment.
Strengthening the role of family farmers means
improving their competitiveness in markets for land,
products, labour and financing, which requires them to
have the information needed to operate in these
markets on advantageous terms. The theory, according
to Escobal (2002), is that there are four types of failures
in institutions that affect the competitiveness of rural
families: i) information asymmetry, ii) the availability
and allocation of public goods, iii) externalities and iv)
the problems of poverty and equity.
Information asymmetry reduces access to markets
that are necessary for small producers to be
competitive. There are problems with access to
information on rural credit mechanisms, both on the
side of rural families and on the side of the banks
themselves, and the same is true of access to land
ownership. It is also very important for grass-roots
organizations17 to be provided with information on
local development programmes and policies,
15 Based on a pioneering study of rural families in the reformed
sector in Mexico (Gordillo, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000).
16 Cited by Easterly (2002).
17 These being groups with common interests, such as women’s
groups, saving clubs, cooperatives, producers’ or irrigation
associations, etc.
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mechanisms for applying for project financing funds
and procedures for interacting with the government and
market (Alkire and others, 2001).
Misallocation and scarcity of public goods hinder
the development of rural sectors. Geographical
dispersion and lower population densities are directly
related to inadequate infrastructure and limited access
to public services, so that investment in these sectors
is considered risky and costly. Furthermore, restricted
access to public goods and services undermines local
input and product markets, and this combines with high
transaction costs to restrict the ability of rural families
to save. It is possible that local efforts towards
collective organization may enable progress to be made
in this area, particularly in the case of small-scale, low-
complexity18 goods and services that require local
cooperation, be they communal (common pastureland,
water for irrigation and so on) or public (local
infrastructure).
The problems of poverty and inequality create a
vicious circle.19 When market institutions do not
resolve these problems, the combined institutional
arrangements of public-sector bodies and civil society
organizations have to underpin the equity and
sustainability of policies and consensus between
parties. For this it is necessary to improve the structure
of social policy through public-sector management that
is based on transparency, citizen oversight and
accountability.
For all the reasons given, there is a need for
policies to raise the competitiveness of rural families
so that these can increase their incomes. It is essential
for the productivity of the poorest to be improved, and
for this improvement to involve their participation in
a growing economy with fair markets. If families are
able to improve their income levels, they will enjoy
food security.
As a number of studies have pointed out, almost
half the income received by rural families in the region
comes from non-agricultural activities. Furthermore, as
a logical consequence of this diversification in rural
economies, capital investment processes in the rural
sector are very heterogeneous. This being so, policies
to raise the competitiveness of rural families need to
take account of the heterogeneity and diversification
of rural markets20 and aim at territorial rather than
sectoral development.
In agriculture, heterogeneity entails the
coexistence of two sectors, each of which has internal
differences as well. One of these two sectors is modern,
businesslike, capital- and technology- intensive and
chiefly export-oriented. The other is intensive in low-
productivity labour, displays major deficiencies and
segmentations, is underendowed with assets and has
very low investment, all of which makes it hard to
attain the efficiency, competitiveness, modernization
and profitability that a sectoral policy might aim at.
Experience has shown that most rural families in a
situation of food risk depend on this type of agriculture.
The modern agricultural sector, meanwhile, instead of
creating strong demand for labour has displaced people
and absorbed most agricultural aid owing to its greater
bargaining and political power. This has intensified the
concentration of land and productive resources and
widened the gap between commercial agriculture and
family farming.
Family farmers, therefore, face internal and
external obstacles to improving their competitiveness.
One way of confronting these is to try to expand their
social and human capital by participating more in
organizations that enable them to influence the design
and application of development and marketing policies,
and also by improving their production techniques. In
turn, governments should work to improve the
functioning and reliability of product, land, labour and
financing markets and to increase producer confidence
in social security mechanisms for overcoming
constraints on natural resources, markets and
infrastructure. Furthermore, States should try to
mitigate inequity through more democratic and stable
institutions, better redistribution policies and greater
investment in human capital.
2. A programme of support for family farming
On the basis of the foregoing, a minimum programme
to support agriculture and rural development has been
18 Low complexity in this context refers to the homogeneity of actors
and their interests.
19 Lynn Karl (2002) has explained this vicious circle as a situation
where poverty and high levels of inequality perpetuate each other
and in turn restrain economic growth. This situation makes it
considerably harder to deal with the problems that derive from
poverty and inequity.
20 The rural world has seen vigorous growth in service sectors not
directly linked to agrifood and industrial chains, but meeting demand
from human settlements in the countryside. Furthermore,
construction, infrastructure and public services are featuring ever
more strongly in the rural economy, reducing the share of the
agricultural sector.
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stylized,21 combining different development policy
measures to improve the functioning of rural markets.
The starting point was the observation that the
dispersion of instruments harmed rural actors
(especially family farmers), raised transaction costs,
encouraged corruption and fomented disputes between
State bureaucracies, leading to duplication of effort. It
can never be stressed too strongly that what matters
even more than the amount of public resources going
to the countryside is the way these are channelled.
This minimum programme needs to contain
certain elements to underpin a basic strategy for new
forms of public support in the countryside. Its
objectives are as follows:
i) To increase the competitiveness of what is
produced by rural inhabitants affected by the
region’s economic changes and structural reforms
by means of direct, temporary, selective support
that equips them to compete in new areas of
specialization, fully respecting the need to
conserve natural resources. A rural incomes policy
whose continuity is guaranteed by law and
periodically reviewed22 can provide the core of a
unified support programme for family farming.
ii) To promote voluntary, self-sustaining partnership
initiatives among the rural groups affected, so that
these can form organizations capable of sustaining
the initial achievements of such income support
programmes over time.
iii) To provide direct assistance and services to
households in disadvantaged areas. This direct
support policy can become the starting point for
a set of policy instruments which, properly
designed, should help strengthen the new links
between policies, producers and other economic
agents.
iv) A system of rural financing that mobilizes saving
in the family farming sector and emphasizes
capital formation.
v) An infrastructure policy that, without neglecting
certain large-scale strategic irrigation projects,
aims at a considerable increase both in small-scale
production infrastructure (irrigation, soil and
aquifer conservation) and in commercial
infrastructure (roads, warehouses, refrigeration
plants and transport systems).
vi) A policy of support for innovation and technology
transfer that involves universities and technology
institutes in a programme of mass transfer and
dissemination of skills and know-how, supported
by new interactions with producers and
underpinned by the premise that human capital is
a key factor in competitiveness.
vii) Equitable, sustainable policies for access to the
natural resources needed to sustain adequate
livelihoods for the rural populations of the region,
these policies to include land reforms and other
land access mechanisms as appropriate.
21 In other words, a set of invariable elements has been identified,
obviously requiring adaptation to the very heterogeneous character
of the region’s countryside and to priorities that will likewise depend
on the particular context.
22 One example is the Programme of Direct Support to the
Countryside (PROCAMPO) in Mexico, which can provide a basis for
this, particularly since the recent amendments to the Rural
Capitalization Act.
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